This paper estimates a Frequent Flyer Programs (FFP) price premium-higher fares associated with a larger proportion of travelers using FFP. The results show that FFP affect the entire price distribution, but the effect is larger on lower end fares. In addition, airport dominance increases the premium on less expensive fares but has no effect on the premium associated with the right tail of the price distribution.
the formation of partnerships to estimate that at least 25% of the 'hub premium'-higher fares charged by hub airlines for flights originating at its hub-can be accounted by FFP.
Other papers on FFP include Lederman (2007) who looks at the effect of international partnerships on domestic demand and Bilotkach (2009) who looks at partnerships and frequency. Despite the importance of FFP, research in this area is scarce mainly because information on individual miles balances are not available to researchers. This paper uses a novel way to measure the extent of FFP to overcome this obstacle.
The current paper extends existing literature in three aspects. First, it provides an estimate of the FFP premium-higher fares associated with FFP. Second, it assesses the effect of FFP on the distribution of fares, and third, it evaluates the role of airport dominance on the effect of FFP on different percentiles of fares. The results show that a one percent increase in the proportion of travelers that use frequent flyer programs increases average fares by 1.16%. The effect is larger on the lower end of the price distribution than on more expensive tickets. Moreover, the effect of FFP on lower end fares was found to be greater when the carrier has a dominant position in the departing airport.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of the data, Section 3 presents the empirical model and Section 4 provides the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Data
The data set for this paper comes from the market and the ticket sub-sections of the DB1B database and the segment sub-section of the T-100 database from the Bureau of Transportation and Statistics (BTS). The DB1B is a 10% random sample quarterly data of airline passenger ticket transactions with information on the ticket price, origin, destination and any connecting airports, carrier, type of ticket and service class. The T-100 has information on number of performed departures as well as number of seats and transported passengers between an origin and destination airport pair.
The paper focuses on domestic, round-trip, coach class tickets between the first quarter of 2000 and the third quarter of 2009. We restrict the analysis to round-trip tickets because these tickets allow us to identify the originating airport of the ticket. To restrict the analysis to economically significant routes, the sample includes only routes that had at least one carrier transporting an average of 40 passengers per week, by either direct or connecting service. The construction of the data set is such that each observation in the sample corresponds to a route-a pair of origin and destination airports-served by a carrier on a quarter. The carriers considered are AirTran, Alaska, American, Continental, Delta, Frontier, JetBlue, Northwest, Spirit, Trans World Airlines, United, and US Airways, each with its corresponding FFP partners. Because frequent flyer miles can also be obtained by traveling with a carrier's FFP partner, we identified the partners of each of the main carriers and considered those tickets as belonging to the main carrier. e.g. American Eagle miles count towards American Airlines' frequent flyer program.
Empirical Model
To investigate the relationship between pricing and the extent of frequent flyer programs, we estimate the following reduced-form pricing equation:
where each observation refers to route i, carrier j during quarter t. The dependent variable log Meanfare is the logarithm of the average of fares. To further analyze the effect of loyalty programs on the tails of the price distribution we will also use the log 20th and the log 80th percentiles of fares as dependent variables, log 20Pctfare and log 80Pctfare, Propdirect ijt is the proportion of direct flights. Also in X ′ ijt , Numdest ijt is the total number of destination of carrier i out of the departing airport on route j and Loadfact ijt is the load factor or capacity utilization. Finally, ν t denotes the unobservable time specific effect, ε ij captures any unobservable carrier-route time-invariant specific effect and µ ijt is the remaining disturbance. The fixed effects control, for example, for changes over time in industry-level prices and for time-invariant hub effects on pricing.
A positive δ coefficient will be evidence of a positive FFP premium. To analyze the role of airport dominance on the FFP premium we present two additional specifications.
The first includes the interaction term Ffp ijt × Propdepa ijt in Equation 1 to see how the premium changes as a carrier increases its presence at the departing airport. The second approach separates the effect of Fft ijt on fares in two, when the proportion of departures is below its median and when it is above its median:
The indicator variable 1 [Propdepa > med(Propdepa)] is equal to one when Propdepa ijt is above its median, zero otherwise. The estimation of Equations 1 and 2 will additionally consider various log percentiles of fares as dependent variables.
Estimation Results
The summary statistics of the variables is presented in Table 1 The results indicate that the effect of the programs on the lower tail of fares is larger when the proportion of departures is larger than its median. There is no statistically significant difference between δ 1 and δ 2 for higher end fares.
Conclusions
Our measure of frequent flyer programs shows an intuitive positive and highly statistically significant FFP premium. While the positive premium affects the entire price distribution, the effect was found to be larger for lower end fares. A one percent increase in the proportion of travelers who use frequent flyer miles increases average fares by 1.16% and increases the 20th percentile and the 80th percentile of fares by 3.06% and 1.03%, respectively. Airport dominance showed to play an important role by increasing the FFP premium only on lower end fares. 
